

CSILLA MOLNÁR¹**The Persuasive Speech in Rhetoric and Tales²**

Although the original situation of rhetorical speech and the speech in tales bears resemblance with each other (mutual attention of the speaker and the audience, the aesthetic formation of the speech), but in my paper I aim to analyse the difference of persuasion. In rhetoric it means the deliberate use of certain formations to achieve the desired effect on the audience. The basis of persuasion is the acceptance of probability. The tale can be interpreted as a meaning revelation in the hermeneutic progress of understanding, which supposes an equal inclusion both from the side of the speaker and the listener. In this case the speech embodies the world-like presence of language. In conclusion, these two methods of persuasion are in relationship with deeper disparities of the aesthetic impression and the aesthetic recognition.

1. Introduction

In my paper I aim to analyse the difference of speech in rhetoric and tales from the aspect of persuasion. Firstly, rhetoric speech and speech in tales can be described with two methods of persuasion. In the first case, it means the conscious use of particular rhetoric forms, by which the right effect can be made on the audience. The basics of persuasion is the acceptance of probability. In the second case, understanding can be interpreted as a meaning revelation created in the hermeneutic process, which assumes the compeer involvement of the speaker and the audience as well. In this case, the speech incorporates the worldlike presence of the language.

2. The Means of Persuasion

Rhetoric has appeared in the context of persuasion since the beginnings. In the antiquities the representatives of the Sicilian rhetoric school, Corax and Tisias formulated rhetoric as the creator of persuasion. According to Aristotle "*Rhetoric may be defined as the faculty of*

¹ Associate professor, University of Sopron, Faculty of Pedagogy, Institute of Social Sciences and Communication; molnar.csilla@uni-sopron.hu

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observing in any given case the available means of persuasion. This is not a function of any other art. Every other art can instruct or persuade about its own particular subject-matter; for instance, medicine about what is healthy and unhealthy, geometry about the properties of magnitudes, arithmetic about numbers, and the same is true of the other arts and sciences. But rhetoric we look upon as the power of observing the means of persuasion on almost any subject presented to us; and that is why we say that, in its technical character, it is not concerned with any special or definite class of subjects” (Aristot. Rh. 1.2.).

So neither *episteme* (pure theory, knowledge) nor *techné* (craft, art), but *dynamis* (ability, opportunity) which can be advanced to *techne*.

As Nietzsche has already formulated, rhetoric in the classical definition of Aristotle means the point of understanding when we realise the possibility of persuasion, which can be introduced later as something recognised. The temporality of rhetorics involves two different moments. In the first one recognition happens and then in the real rhetoric fulfilment, in speech it is all introduced to others (Nietzsche, 1989). Rhetoric needs the hermeneutical event, however rhetoric itself is the means like use of this interpretation, it involves the third moment of the triformity of the hermeneutical event (understanding-interpretation-implication).

Contrary to this, the tale can be seen as a method of speech, during which understanding is created by the common participation of the speaker and the audience, so the hermeneutic event can be conceived as simultaneity. Of course, there is a difference between the tale as a form of art and as a narrative activity. Tales, as a genre, can be read individually and any stories can be said like tales. It is common however, that just like the activity of reading, telling and listening also stipulate understanding.

According to Gadamer, it is a common feature of each speech that *"we do not transmit exact facts to each other but we put our own knowledge and motivations in a wider and richer horizon. Each understandable and understood statement is involved into the motion of questions, so they get interpreted as motivated answers. Conversation is conversation with each other. An encounter with a word or just letting it pass us by, both of them are basically linguistic experience"* (Gadamer, 1986, p. 144). The rhetoric and poetic experience seems to resemble, as when they come to realisation, both create communities, the community of understanding. An important difference is, however, that the rhetoric community is realised by the use of persuasive means, so it is the result of the speakers purposeful motivation (Kuziak–Rzeczynski, 2004). On the other hand, the community of poetic reception comes to realisation in the course of games and cultic activities, which links and involves participants throughout their necessary presence (Gadamer, 2004).

"A tale's original and natural context is a specific communicational situation. In traditional societies, tale-telling and the opportunity to tell a tale is a separable moment, which is often a part of a well-structured order of a ritual" (Biczó, 2006, p. 15).

3. The Hermeneutical Excess of Poeticity

In comparison with the rhetoric experience, poetic experience can be described as a hermeneutic situation with an excess. According to Gadamer, the poetic text, including the narration and the tale, is independent from all forms of the motivated speech. In this case, it is not our main focus who wants to say something and why. We do not accept a statement but a saying unshackled from the intention. Its persuasive character and justice are of a different nature than the persuasive effect of a speech, when somebody says something, where rhetoric also belongs. In the former case, if the speech as a performance in an aesthetic sense persuades us, then it will persuade us with what it says (Gadamer, 2004).

At the same time, it is also important that these self-approved texts have three types. One of them is the religious text, which Gadamer defines as an approval *Zusage*, Northrop Frye defines as *kerygma*. The second type is the *announcement* that belongs to legislation (Gadamer: *Ansage*), in which the character of the announcement creates the legal validity. The third type is the artistic text, which can be perceived as a declaration (Gadamer: *Aussage*) with a need for completeness. The accomplishment feature of the statement is determining, according to which *"we do not have to add anything to its reception and linguistic character that is not disclosed in itself. It is autonomous in its own accomplishment. The poetic word is a statement in a sense that it validates itself and it does not provide any room for verification"* (Gadamer, 1986, p. 149).

4. The Tale as a Hermeneutic Task

Previously, we have separated the tale as a form from the activity of tale-telling. Thirdly, in correlation with tales we can also mention the tale-characters the active agents in the texts of tales. It is also valid for them that *"each tale can be apprehended as an attempt for interpretation, the attempt of the hero to solve a task is not other than an interpretational exercise. Who understands the inner meaning of the situation? How do the characters*

understand and interpret their situation? Which one of them is able to make an advantage by finding or finding out the adequate meaning?" (Biczó, 2006, p. 13).

Accordingly, motion in place and time in the world of tales is present as part of the process of understanding, as the hermeneutic attempt of the hero, the tale-teller and the audience. After all, it has not been answered yet, how to demonstrate the connection between the tale as a genre and the tale as an activity of speaking. If the genres are considered as preliminary patterns of understanding, we seem to get closer to find the hermeneutic horizon that sees the aspects of the tale in a comprehensive frame. In this case, the way of the tale's hero, the happenings meanwhile and the time assigned to it can be interpreted as the finite number of syntactic and grammatic elements of the tale. It is sort of a vocabulary of a language within the language and a system of rules, that just like the language as a whole, is theoretically finite, but in practice it enables an infinite version, so that the exact meaning is always updated in a hermeneutic event. It corresponds the previously mentioned duality of the tale form and tale activity.

This is a kind of recognition. *"But what is recognition? It is surely not merely a question of seeing something for the second time. Nor does it imply a whole series of encounters. Recognition means knowing something as that with which we are already acquainted. This is something that we are all familiar with. Recognition always implies that we have come to know something more authentically than we were able to do when caught up in our first encounter with it. Recognition elicits the permanent from the transient"* (Gadamer, 1986, p. 47).

5. The Expansion of Rhetoric

Since the second half of the eighteenth century, parallel to the breakthrough of natural sciences, rhetoric as a science and practice gradually became suspicious. Its position was worsened by the appearance of the modern art theory that emphasized originality and individuality, so the repetitive and acquired feature of rhetoric was devaluated in this aspect as well. New paradigms of a need for justice and value developed in sciences and art. Rhetoric managed to maintain its legitimacy only in law, classical philology and in some public areas, however, since the middle of the twentieth century the latter has become anachronistic as well. Before the millenium, rhetoric gained new scenes and this process has not finished today either. The new relation to the media and the appearance of new communicational areas enable new communicational forms, in which the values of rhetoric became attractive again. All of these represent a new challenge to the science of rhetoric. *"The mixture of classical rhetoric tradition with the vocabulary of the new media can result in two possible ways. On the one hand, it can assign*

the beginning of modern rhetoric. On the other hand, it can outline a new communicational culture with a changing new rhetoric canon structure" (Aczél, 2012, p. 102).

According to this correlation, today's rhetoric strategy is implemented in practice, as something that is able to form and arrange the value structure of the communicational process.

6. The Hermeneutics of Rhetoric and the Rhetoric of Hermeneutics

Nowadays, there are newly formed correlations in practice and in theory as well, throughout which rhetoric and hermeneutics can be related, although earlier they were considered excluding. One of these paradigms is *invitation rhetoric* (Foss-Griffin, 1995). It can be considered as an invitation to understanding, which results in the correlation. The gesture of invitation aims to involve the audience, in order that the speaker and its audience can contribute to the existence of a deeper and richer meaning and understanding (Aczél, 2012). A wider environment of invitation rhetorics is created by systems that generate the so-called participation culture. Theoretically, a rhetorical method would start to operate here, in which commitment and creativity support each other. However, the experience of new medial and communicational scenes show that the functioning of these communicational situations is strongly dependent on culture, as pre-conditions like tolerance, limitlessness, the lack of hierarchy the opportunities of perspectives and continuity have to be valid at the same time, in order that the above mentioned practice could be realised.

Returning to Aristotle's use of concepts mentioned in the introduction of the presentation, the practise of rhetoric and hermeneutics can be interpreted as *dynamis* in the force field of episteme and *techne*, that also needs opportunity conditions. The rhetorisation of hermeneutics can be the pair of the hermeneutisation of rhetoric, when *kairos*, originally belonging to rhetoric, becomes the own part of the hermeneutical event. This increased reflection of temporality makes the paradoxical incorporation of understanding and persuasion possible. Its reason can be understood only after you start to suspect that not every pre-condition of the event can be influenced. According to Derrida the waiting attention before *kairos* means the paradoxical experience between *tukhē* and *automaton* for the participants, "*Tukhē designates in general a chance when the latter derives its meaning with regard to a human finality, intention, or intentionality (...) whereas automaton designates in general, spontaneity without intentional implications. It is true that Aristotle does not always respect this distinciton. We had to privilege this Aristotelian concept of tukhē for reasons essential to the structure of the*

gift and the pas de don, the gift step/no gift. For in that structure chance is constantly, in advance even, re-finalized, re-intentionalized and regulary reappropriated by a teleology: the desire to create an aleatory event, the benevolence of nature in the gift that the narrator has the good luck to receive from so forth” (Derrida, 1992, p. 133).

7. Summary

From a phenomenological approach, the rhetoric and the poetic speech, including the tale, assumes two directions of the meaning. In the course of the former, there is a promise regarding that what has been said will have a counterpart in the common reality for the audience. The artistic speech, however, is able to fulfill itself by involving the audience in its presence. This opens up the existence defining role of the mother tongue and that of the nature of the relationship to the mother tongue, which makes our existence in the world comfortable (Heidegger). *"The thing that we grow into a language always means that not only our language and its words and phrases become familiar but also their meanings that we aim to express with them. It also means that the world gets close to us and it stands in a given mental order. The words are the same, basic articulations, which lead our interpretation of the world. It belongs to the familiarity of the world that this world maintains itself in our communicational processes with each other"* (Gadamer, 1986, pp. 155–156).

Furthermore, within the poetic speech it is the peculiarity of the tale speech that due to its bound forms and repetitive structural and plot elements, it gets predictable up to a certain extent. So not its new and unexpected text elements give its appeal, but the opportunity for the experience with an ontological significance. From this point of view there is a special excess. In each case, a rhetorical speech is unique, once in a lifetime and as it follows, unexpected for its audience. One of the challenges of the eloquent speech is that it has to surpass the expectations. It can only evolve its effect, if it is able to provide something unusual and new for its audience. To achieve this, it is necessary to possess individual creativity. Since the end of the twentieth century it has put rhetoric in new correlations again, which at the beginning of the new era appeared to be more and more ambiguous for the new way of thinking and for the new need for justice.

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