A természeti létezők tipológiája Arisztotelésznél. Második rész

Absztrakt

The first part of the paper (Molnár 2022) examined the typology Aristotle proposes as the extension of the term “things that exist by nature” in Physics B.1 and compared it to passages containing similar typologies in the Aristotelian corpus, most importantly Metaphysics D.8, Z.2, H.1, De Caelo G.1, and Meteorology A.1. The comparative analysis revealed that – even though Aristotle introduces the lists in different philosophical contexts, and one can find several instances of discrepancies between them – there is a remarkable level of coherence between his verbal definitions, given in different texts, of the genus of which the items in the lists are the subtypes. Part Two (appearing here) sets out to analyse the structure of the typologies one by one, and uncovers a set of common structuring principles behind them. Although the individual passages make use of these principles in rather diverse ways, the texts can be ordered according to the degree of complexity they display. The concept of body proves to be the most important structure-building factor and a general scheme is suggested as underlying all the passages. Part Three (appearing in a later issue) will go on to scrutinize individual items on the lists one by one: the elements, inanimate natural objects, living beings and their parts, celestial bodies, and the heaven. It will also discuss the chronological relations between the texts and, most importantly, the impact Aristotle’s revisionist treatment of the concept of substance has on his typology. Based on the findings, at the end of the paper a cautious attempt will be made at an interpretation of the Aristotelian concepts of nature and substance in terms of the sociology of knowledge by connecting them to his concept of autarky (central in another part of his philosophy).